CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 July 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Bogumil Sujka (Poland)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 565th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As there are some organizational questions pending, including requests from non-member States to participate in the informal meetings on the substance of agenda items 2 and 3, the Conference will hold an informal meeting once the list of speakers is exhausted. We shall later resume the plenary meeting and formalize any decisions agreed upon at the informal meeting.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United Kingdom and Japan.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom): On 26 June I made a statement on behalf of the delegations of Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United States and the United Kingdom, to introduce a message and communiqué from the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Turnberry on 7 and 8 June. Today, on behalf of the same delegations, I have circulated as CD/1013 the text of the Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the North Atlantic Council in London on 5 and 6 July.

As before, I would urge delegates to read the text in full, but it might be helpful for me to draw attention to some of the major points.

The Heads of State and Government of the Alliance recognize that Europe has entered a new, promising era. The Alliance must and will adapt.

The North Atlantic Alliance must continue to provide for the common defence, to extend the long peace enjoyed these past four decades. Yet security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and the political component of the Alliance should be enhanced. The Allies must work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East and extend to them the hand of friendship.

The unification of Germany means that the division of Europe is also being overcome. A united Germany in the Atlantic Alliance of free democracies, and part of the growing political and economic integration of the European Community, will be an indisputable factor of stability. The move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

The Alliance will never in any circumstances be the first to use force. The Allies propose a joint declaration between member States of the two alliances which will make clear they are no longer adversaries, and invite other member States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to join in this commitment to non-aggression.

The Allies invite President Gorbachev and representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries to address the North Atlantic Council, and to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible to share with them Allied thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change. The Allies also offer intensive military contacts, and propose another CSCE military doctrine seminar this autumn. The Allies intend to establish an entirely different quality of openness in Europe, including an agreement on "open skies".

The Declaration sets out a common approach on conventional arms control in the period up to the 1992 Helsinki CSCE meeting and beyond. It attaches the highest priority to completing this year a Conventional Forces in Europe agreement, as well as a package of confidence- and security-building measures. Immediately after signature of the CFE agreement, follow-on talks with the same membership and mandate should start, focused on limiting manpower in Europe. At the time this treaty is signed, a commitment will be given on manpower levels in a unified Germany. Beyond 1992, the Alliance foresees new conventional arms control negotiations, within the CSCE framework, aimed at further far-reaching measures to limit the offensive capability of conventional armed forces in Europe. This is an ambitious agenda, but it matches our goal: enduring peace in Europe.

On force structures, the declaration reaffirms the importance of North American conventional and United States nuclear forces in Europe. It also points the way to a reshaping of the conventional forces in Europe of NATO's integrated force structure towards smaller, more mobile units, made up of an increasingly multinational corps. NATO's integrated force structure will scale back the readiness of its active units, and rely more heavily on the possibility for reinforcements.

The Declaration reaffirms the key principles of the Alliance's strategy: to keep the peace, the Alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe, and kept up-to-date where necessary. But, as a defensive Alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence and that we seek the lowest and most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the prevention of war.

The political and military changes in Europe, and the prospects of further changes, now allow the Allies concerned to modify the size and adapt the task of their nuclear deterrent forces:

The Allies concerned will need far fewer nuclear weapons, particularly sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range;

They are willing to eliminate nuclear artilleries from Europe in return for reciprocal Soviet action;

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

New negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces should begin shortly after signature of the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement;

With the total withdrawal of Soviet-stationed forces and the implementation of a Conventional Forces in Europe agreement, the Allies concerned can reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. These will continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. However, in the transformed Europe, they will be able to adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.

The Allies concerned will prepare a new Allied military strategy, moving away from forward defence, where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence, and modifying flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.

The Declaration calls for a more prominent role for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, bringing together the countries of Europe and North America. The Declaration supports a CSCE summit later this year in Paris which would conclude the signature of a Conventional Forces in Europe agreement and set new standards for the establishment and preservation of free societies. The declaration also proposes that the CSCE summit decide how the CSCE can be institutionalized to provide a forum for wider political dialogue in a more united Europe. The Allies list a number of specific proposals to these ends.

With this Declaration, the Alliance has begun a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, the Allies are determined to create enduring peace for this continent.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): Mr. President, I should like to report on the result of the consultations on the question of a mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. However, since it is the first time I take the floor this month, please allow me to extend to you my delegation's congratulations on your assumption of the very important post of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is pleased to see you in the Chair and to see that under your able and skilful guidance our work is making steady headway. In particular, the strong initiative you personally took by inviting co-ordinators of agenda item 1 to the last three presidential consultations contributed immensely to making it possible for us to arrive at the stage where we find ourselves today after so many months and so many years.

Now, I shall make a factual account of consultations conducted by my delegation on the question of a mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban." As is well known, the consultation was initiated by my predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, when he was the President of the Conference in March last year. The Conference had been prevented from substantial work on the agenda item since 1984 due to the deadlock caused by conflicting group positions on the question of the mandate. Therefore, Ambassador Yamada embarked upon a process of a series of

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

dialogues with each delegation on an informal and individual basis, in search of a way to disentangle ourselves from the impasse. Successive Presidents for the remaining months of last year encouraged Ambassador Yamada to continue his consultations. As early as at the end of last year's session of the Conference, Ambassador Yamada was convinced that the draft mandate contained in CD/863, which in turn was produced by Ambassador Vejvoda when he was the President of the Conference in 1987, could in fact be used as a basis to work out a consensus mandate, and this was stated in Ambassador Yamada's farewell speech before he left Geneva.

At the beginning of this year's session of the Conference, as was stated by the President of the Conference at the time, Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, I willingly agreed to continue the consultations initiated by my predecessor. As a result of the continued consultations, I also could reconfirm for myself the conviction that the draft mandate in CD/863 could be used to disentangle ourselves from the impasse of conflicting group positions. By the end of February this year, all the groups, except for the Group of 21, expressed their readiness to take the draft mandate contained in CD/863 as a basis for negotiating a consensus mandate, without prejudice to their respective preferred mandates. However, due to the non-negotiating character of the Vejvoda draft mandate, the Group of 21 had to take a little longer time to consult within the Group. On 14 March, at the presidential consultation which was presided over by Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, and to which agenda item 1 co-ordinators were also invited, the Group of 21 stated that it would not object, without prejudice to its position on this question as set out in document CD/829, to the taking of the Vejvoda draft mandate as a point of departure for consultation aimed at reaching agreement on a mandate for the ad hoc committee, if all other delegations were prepared to do so. This demonstration of flexibility on the part of the Group of 21 was appreciated by all other groups. The delegation of the People's Republic of China also expressed its readiness to go along with whatever consensus was reached by all other groups, as well as its readiness to participate in the work of the ad hoc committee when it was established.

Thereafter, there were several occasions where agenda item 1 co-ordinators met either by themselves or at the presidential consultations upon invitation. At these meetings it became clear the the Group of Eastern European Countries and Others, as well as the People's Republic of China, could accept the draft mandate in CD/863 without any wording changes, if other groups could do the same. The Western Group could not express its views because delegations were waiting for instructions from their capitals. The Group of 21, although it did not propose any amendments, was not in a position to state that it could accept the draft mandate without any amendments before it was informed of the position of the Western Group. Thus, it was the turn for the Western Group to take time for consultation.

On 3 July, at an extraordinary presidential consultation convened by you, Mr. President, a Group of Western Countries informed all other groups that it decided to accept, in a spirit of compromise, the draft mandate contained in CD/863 without any changes, and proposed that other groups should do the same. The Group of Eastern European Countries and Others, as well as the People's Republic of China, expressed willingness to agree to the proposal, but the Group of 21 expressed its wish to be given a little more time.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Finally, on 11 July, at the presidential consultation, the Group of 21 informed the rest of the groups that it also decided to accept the draft mandate contained in CD/863 without any changes, in a spirit of compromise and flexibility, which was welcomed by all the rest of the groups.

Mr. President, it is with sentiments of profound gratitude to you personally, and also to all the delegations around this table, as well as to Secretary-General Ambassador Komatina and his deputy, Ambassador Berasategui, that I can report to you of the successful completion of my delegation's consultation on the question of the mandate for agenda item 1. On behalf of my predecessor and myself, and on behalf of my delegation, I wish to express our utmost appreciation of the warm words of encouragement expressed to us on a number of occasions, and also of the generous support and understanding extended to us during the last 16 months. My statement will be far from complete without expressing also our thankfulness to the dedicated wisdom of Ambassador Vejvoda of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic for leaving us with a very thoughtful draft text of a mandate which is no other than the one we have in front of us today. I would like to ask Ambassador Králik to convey my delegation's appreciation and best regards to Ambassador Vejvoda.

Lastly, let me add one further point. In 1982 and 1983, when we had an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, two nuclear-weapon States did not participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee, which was regretted by all the rest of the delegations at that time. This time, although the participation of France has not yet been promised, the People's Republic of China has, as I reported earlier, made it clear that it would participate in the work of the ad hoc committee when it is established, and I am confident that this very significant and very positive step taken by our Chinese colleague will be whole-heartedly welcomed by delegations around the table.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. At the same time, I welcome the positive results achieved in the consultations undertaken by Ambassador Donowaki on a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1. I am sure all members will agree with me that such results are the consequence of the active efforts of Ambassador Donowaki and his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada. Their skillful handling of this important subject, as well as their able diplomacy, have led to the present situation.

I already announced at the opening of this plenary meeting that we shall hold today an informal meeting to consider a number of organizational questions. Of course, the question of a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1 should be addressed at that meeting, together with requests from non-Members to participate in our work.

If there is no objection, I shall proceed to suspend this plenary meeting and to hold an informal meeting of the Conference in five minutes' time. Immediately afterwards, we shall resume the plenary meeting in order to formalize any agreement reached at the informal meeting. Is that acceptable? I see no objection. I therefore declare the plenary meeting suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 10.35 a.m. and resumed at 10.45 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 565th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As a result of the informal meeting just held, I invite the Conference to take action on several organizational questions. I suggest that we take up, first, document CD/WP.387, containing a draft decision for the mandate of an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban". If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

I shall now put before the Conference for decision the appointment of the representative of Japan, Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee just re-established. I understand that there is agreement on his appointment.

It was so decided.

On behalf of the Conference and myself, I wish to extend to Ambassador Donowaki our warm congratulations on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. I am sure that he will discharge his heavy responsibilities with his well-known diplomatic skill and personal commitment, which he has shown in successfully conducting consultations on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee.

As regards the first meeting of the Ad hoc Committee, I wish to inform the Conference that it will be held on Friday, 20 July, at 3 p.m., in this conference room.

May I ask whether any member wishes to take the floor at this stage?

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): I am indeed honoured and overwhelmed by the support and trust extended to me by you, Mr. President, and by all the Groups and delegations here. In accepting the nomination humbly, I wish to make myself clear about my willingness and readiness to serve as best I can all of you in chairing the work of the Ad hoc Committee which has just been established.

I certainly look forward to working together with all the delegations with the support of our secrtariat, in trying to set ourselves on the right track in our quest for a truly meaningful approach with respect to the task assigned to us under the mandate which has just been adopted by us. The task entrusted to the Ad hoc Committee is of great importance and, at the same time, of enormous complexity with far-reaching political implications. How competent the Ad hoc Committee will be in dealing with the challenge is bound to be closely followed not only by our capitals but also by various quarters of the world outside this conference room. Whether our Ad hoc Committee will be able to make any meaningful progress in its deliberations of the agenda item will largely depend upon our own ability, resourcefulness and resolve. Therefore, as the newly appointed Chairman, while I pledge to dedicate myself to serving you as best I can, I humbly request all my colleagues to demonstrate as much as possible the spirit of compromise, co-operation and flexibility which has been demonstrated abundantly during the course of the consultations conducted by my delegation on the question of the mandate for agenda item 1.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Mr. President, the Netherlands delegation is pleased to see you, the distinguished representative of Poland, in the Chair. My delegation feels confident about the execution of this month's business in the Conference on Disarmament because of your great experience, your high professional qualities, your long commitment to the cause of disarmament, and indeed your outstanding leadership.

Today I would like to make a statement on behalf of a Group of Western States and the wording of the statement is as follows:

"On behalf of the delegations of Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and of my own delegation, I would like to make a statement about the decision that we have just taken to establish an ad hoc committee under item 1 of our agenda.

Before addressing the subject matter itself, we would like to thank Ambassador Donowaki of Japan and, through him, his predecessor Ambassador Yamada, for the work they put into bringing the Conference to this point. We also congratulate Ambassador Donowaki on his appointment to chair the Ad hoc Committee. The consensus now established will permit our Conference to restart detailed work under this agenda item after a long delay.

We look forward to detailed discussion in the Committee of the various substantive issues relating to verification and compliance as well as structure and scope. We as a group and as individual States are ready to participate fully.

We are pleased that the Conference agreed that the Committee should be established taking the wording of the draft mandate contained in document CD/863, the work of our former President, Ambassador Vejvoda, without any change.

We are firmly of the belief that the Conference on Disarmament, as the only global multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament questions, is the most appropriate place for in-depth discussion of multilateral aspects of a nucler test ban.

In our view, consideration of the question of a nuclear test ban is still at the exploratory stage. It is therefore proper that the mandate which we have given to the Committee does not require it to enter into negotiation of a treaty text. Before that stage can be reached there is much work to be done, examining the complex of issues appertaining to this topic, for which this mandate is completely adequate.

Since the Conference on Disarmament last had an ad hoc committee on this subject, much as been done relevant to the question of nuclear testing, and particularly in development and implementation of verification methods. We have in mind the important work of the Group of Scientific Experts, and, in the bilateral field, the procedures developed

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

by the United States and the Soviet Union for verification of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. However, much more needs to be done to address the full range of verification issues.

It should be noted that formation of this Committee is consistent with the principal aim of the Partial Test Bank Treaty, as restated in the preamble to the non-proliferation Treaty.

It is our conviction that we should use to the full the limited time available to the Committee in this latter part of the summer session. We would therefore propose that work should begin immediately with a preliminary exchange of views covering the whole range of issues and that the question of a detailed work programme should be looked at in parallel.

We believe that establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with a ban on nuclear testing will help us toward our ultimate goal: a world free of nuclear weapons, in peace and stability."

The PRESIDENT: Thank you for your statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of India, Ambassador Chadha.

Mr. CHADHA (India): I am taking the floor on behalf of the Group of 21. May I, at the outset, say how happy we are in the Group of 21 to see you, Sir, preside over our deliberations this month. We would like to pay a warm tribute to you and to Ambassadors Yamada and Donowaki for the untiring efforts which have led to the decision we have just taken for the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban", an event which has been anxiously awaited by the Group of 21 for so long. The Group would like to extend its felicitations to Ambassador Donowaki on his well-deserved election as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. We have no doubt that, with his experience and diplomatic skill, of which he has given ample evidence in the course of the informal consultations which made today's decision possible, he will be eminently successful in guiding the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee to a fruitful conclusion.

No issue in the field of disarmament is more urgent and crucial today than putting an end to nuclear tests. A comprehensive test-ban treaty is long overdue. The Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body has the primary role in negotiations to achieve this objective, and its achievement will enhance its credibility.

The objective of a nuclear test ban has been repeatedly emphasized in numerous documents adopted unanimously by the United Nations, including the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in the declaration adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Summit in Belgrade. As a significant contribution to the aim of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the Group of 21 has consistently advocated and has continued to attach the highest priority to a nuclear test ban. Despite this commitment of the

(Mr. Chadha, India)

international community, and the recent upturn in the world political climate, there has been no let-up in the qualitative improvement in nuclear weapons. It has been recognized that a ban on nuclear tests will contribute effectively to the arresting of the nuclear arms spiral.

Since 1984 the Group of 21 has made efforts to establish an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate on a nuclear test ban and has repeatedly demonstrated flexibility by advancing various proposals in the search for consensus towards this end. At the beginning of the annual session of the CD this year, the Group had again reiterated that the draft mandate contained in document CD/829 was best suited to accommodate the different positions of all delegations represented in the CD and constituted a sound basis for developing a consensus. This draft mandate had been found acceptable by the Group of Socialist States and the People's Republic of China.

In the spirit of further compromise and flexibility, and in order to facilitate the setting up of an ad hoc committee on item 1 in the CD, the Group of 21 had not objected to the taking of document CD/863 as a basis for a mandate for the ad hoc committee. Without prejudice to its continuing preference for a mandate like the one contained in CD/829, the group has decided not to object to the taking of CD/863 as a mandate for the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee this year.

The Group of 21 considers it essential that the setting up of the Ad hoc Committee should lead to concrete negotiations towards a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty on an urgent basis, and that the committee should not get bogged down in an endless debate on a work programme or on verification prerequisites while the central issue of negotiating a treaty on a nuclear test ban remains unresolved. In view of the fact that the Committee will function for a short period this year, the Group is of the opinion that the CD session next year should be fully utilized for attaining the goal of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

The Group of 21 is convinced that the available techniques of verification, both national and international, are already sufficient to support a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time.

The international community has recognized that questions relating to verification and compliance can only be considered in tandem with other aspects of a treaty. Paragraph 31 of the Final Document of SSOD-I states: "Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided in any agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement".

The Group believes that the nuclear test-ban treaty should be non-discriminatory and comprehensive in character so as to attract universal adherence and should include a verification system that is universal in its application, non-discriminatory its in nature, and guarantees equal access to all States.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you for your statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): The Group of Eastern European and Other Countries, on whose behalf I have the honour to take the floor, welcomes the fact that, after years of consultations, the Conference on Disarmament is in a position to agree on a mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on item 1 of its agenda "Nuclear test ban". It reflects, in our opinion, the declared readiness and political resolve to start dealing with all aspects related to a nuclear test ban in the framework of the Ad hoc Committee to be established. This will give us the opportunity to do substantive work within the Conference on Disarmament on test ban issues, in general, and on related specific issues, such as structure and scope as well as verification and compliance.

Let me take this very occasion to express our appreciation to Ambassador Donawaki and, through him, to Ambassador Yamada for the strenuous efforts undertaken to reach consensus today, 45 years after the first nuclear test, on this crucial matter.

And let me also express our satisfaction that the mandate proposed in document CD/863 was a solid foundation to find a consensus.

Pursuant to the mandate agreed upon, the Ad hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, we believe that the Committee will draw upon the knowledge and experience accumulated over the years.

The Eastern Group would welcome it if the Ad hoc Committee would settle down to work as soon as possible. For that reason, we are prepared to start the work of the Ad hoc Committee immediately, based on the main elements contained in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the mandate agreed upon just now. Such an approach would keep the momentum gathered and would allow us to proceed with the practical work related to a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

At the same time, the Eastern Group is supporting the idea that we should use the forthcoming months to prepare a more detailed programme of work for the Ad hoc Committee so that it can proceed with its work without delay at the beginning of the Conference's 1991 session.

Finally, I would like to use this opportunity to express the extreme pleasure felt by the delegations of the Eastern Group at seeing a representative of Japan presiding over the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in the weeks to come. We are convinced that Ambassador Donowaki, thanks to his personal commitment, his great experience and diplomatic skill, will enable the Committee to gain the momentum to which I have already referred. I assure Ambassador Donowaki of our fullest support. I do this especially in my capacity as Group Co-ordinator for item 1 of our agenda.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): Since this is the first time for me to take the floor at the plenary meetings of the summer session, please allow me to express my appreciation and thanks to the distinguished Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero of Peru, President in June, for the dynamic efforts he made which resulted in a very good start for the summer session. I wish him every success in the important work in which he is now engaged.

Respected Mr. President, I would also like to extend my warmest congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July and my appreciation of the fruitful work that you have done. I am confident that, as the distinguished representative of Poland, with which China enjoys friendly relations, and with your rich experience and outstanding diplomatic skills, you will surely lead the negotiations to new achievements. In this respect, I would also like to assure you and all other delegations of the constructive co-operation of the Chinese delegation. I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey my warm welcome to the new heads of delegations, Ambassador Králik of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ambassador Sinegeorgis of Ethiopia, Ambassador Ricupero of Brazil, Ambassador Chadha of India and Ambassador von Wagner of the Federal Republic of Germany. I sincerely wish them success in their new capacities. At the same time I would also like to express through you, Mr. President, the feeling of sadness of the Chinese delegation and of myself for the departure of Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil, Ambassador Sharma of India, Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia and Ambassador Varga of Hungary. We wish them all the best.

Mr. President, under your presidency, this plenary meeting has just adopted by consensus a decision on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on item 1 of the agenda of the Conference, namely "Nuclear test ban". This marks a new progress made by the Conference in this field of great importance. The Chinese delegation would like to extend its congratulations to you and to all other delegations and express its appreciation for your energetic and effective inspirations, as well as the spirit of compromise manifested by all sides. Here I would like to mention in particular the tireless and unyielding efforts made by the distinguished Ambassador of Japan, Mr. Donowaki. The Chinese delegation congratulates the representative of Japan, a close neighbour of China, on his assumption of the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee and hopes that under his guidance the Ad hoc Committee will achieve substantive results.

Like all other countries of the international community, China has always attached a great importance to the question of a nuclear test ban, which is one of the priority issues on the Conference's agenda. The re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee after an interregnum of six years is the result of the strong demand and the relentless efforts of the whole international community in general and the vast number of third world countries, including the non-aligned countries in particular. For this reason, the Chinese delegation would like to express its appreciation to all sides concerned, and particularly the Group of 21, for their relentless efforts and outstanding contributions.

(Mr. Hou, China)

In his important statement made at the Conference on Disarmament not long ago, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Qian Qichen, expounded comprehensively the principles of the Chinese Government on the issues of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban. Having all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons and made unremitting efforts to this end, China sympathizes with, and understands, the ardent desire of the vast number of third world countries and other non-nuclear-weapon States for the early realization of a complete prohibition of nuclear tests. It is in this spirit that the Chinese delegation welcomes the statement on this issue of a nuclear test ban just made by the Group of 21. As is known, China has always exercised the utmost restraint and prudence as regards nuclear tests. China is actively preparing itself for its participation in the test of international seismic data exchange. Here I would like to reaffirm that the delegation of the People's Republic of China will take an active part in the work of the Ad hoc Committee and together with all other delegations work for the early materialization of a nuclear test ban and effective nuclear disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank you for your statement and for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of France.

Mr. de la BAUME (France) (translated from French): As the Conference will have noted, my delegation did not object to the consensus on re-establishing an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda, "Nuclear test ban", nor did we oppose the adoption of a mandate for the Ad hoc Committee in accordance with document CD/863.

However, my delegation would like to remind the Conference of the content of the statement it made in plenary on 18 July last year. I quote: "We shall refrain from participating in any exercise which corresponds to a conception of nuclear disarmament that we do not share". France's position of principle on the subject is well known and has not changed. My delegation will have occasion to revert to it at greater length when the time is ripe.

Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom was one of those Western member States on whose behalf Ambassador Wagenmakers has just spoken. We fully associate ourselves with his statement regarding the establishment of an ad hoc committee to discuss nuclear testing issues in accordance with item 1 of our agenda. We will play a full part in the work of the Committee. The policy of my Government on the matter of nuclear testing is well known. For the foreseeable future, the United Kingdom's security will depend on deterrence based, in part, on the possession of nuclear weapons. That will mean a continuing requirement to conduct underground nuclear tests to ensure that our nuclear weapons remain effective and up-to-date. A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term goal. Progress will be made only by a step-by-step approach. This must take account of technical advances on verification, as well as progress elsewhere in arms control and the attitude of other States. My delegation looks forward to discussing all these issues in the Ad hoc Committee. We hope its substantive work can begin soon so that some of the important ground can be covered in the weeks ahead. We plan to make an active contribution.

(Mr. Kenyon, United Kingdom)

Finally, may I add our congratulations to Ambassador Donowaki on his appointment to chair the Committee and his efforts in bringing about consensus on a mandate. This makes his appointment particularly appropriate. I am sure he will bring the same distinction to his new role as the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): The United States is also pleased that the Conference on Disarmament has now formed a committee to work on item 1 of its agenda, "Nuclear test ban". We have heard today important statements from Groups and from individual States. As a nuclear-weapon State with responsibilities to others that go beyond our own direct national defence and far beyond our national boundaries, the United States has a profound interest in this topic. The United States general views were also represented in the statement given a few minutes ago by Ambassador Wagenmakers on behalf of a group comprising most of the Western countries. But let me give the Conference some brief additional comments that relate to the national position of the United States.

The position of the United States with regard to a test ban has not changed. In a spirit of compromise to facilitate the formation of the Committee, we have set aside our reservations about document CD/863 and agreed to accept that non-negotiating text as the mandate. It is our intent to participate fully in the work of the Committee, listening carefully to the views of others, presenting our views and sharing the results of our research and relevant technologies. A comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a long-term United States objective. Such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when the United States no longer needs to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability. And when the following have been achieved: broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions; greatly improved verification capabilities; expanded confidence-building measures; and greater balance in conventional forces.

In sum, the United States will continue to approach the question of a nuclear test ban with a step-by-step approach which takes into account the security criteria I just mentioned. Only in this way can we prudently preserve our security and the security of others to whom we have commitments as substantial political change proceeds in the international arena.

Mr. SMIDOVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The USSR delegation fully subscribes to the views expressed by Ambassador Dietze in his statement on behalf of the Group of Eastern European and Other Countries, of which the Soviet Union is a member.

The USSR delegation intends to take a most active part in the work of the recently established Ad hoc Committee in all areas of its activity. The aim of our efforts remains unchanged: the earliest possible full ban on nuclear-weapon tests. The Soviet Union's main approaches to the achievement of this aim were set out in the statement by the Head of the USSR delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, S. Batsanov, on 28 June this year. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT: Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

I should like now to turn to the requests of two non-member States to participate at informal meetings of the Conference on the substance of agenda items 2 and 3. The note by the President is contained in document CD/WP.386. Are there any objections to the context of that note? I see no objection.

It was so decided.

In connection with the decision that we have just taken, I wish to note that the statement made by the President of the Conference at the resumed 534th plenary meeting applies also to the requests that we have just considered today.

I have no other business for today and I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. Before doing so, I should like to recall that the Conference will hold today an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2. I would also like to inform the members of the Group of 21 that, after the informal plenary session, the Group of 21 will have its Contact Group on negative security assurances in room C.108.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 19 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.566
19 July 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 July 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Bogumil Sujka (Poland)

GE.90-62228/2171B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 566th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Sweden, Mexico and Argentina.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference. This month, we have already been able to register a major achievement in the decision to establish an ad hoc committee on the nuclear test ban. I am convinced that we will continue to work and to make progress under your stewardship characterized by your experience, tact and your sense of humour. I would also like to express the gratitude of my delegation to Ambassador de Rivero for the skilful manner in which he guided our work in the month of June.

The rapid political changes in the past year and progress achieved in the bilateral disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have given rise to expectations for new opportunities in the multilateral field. There is, however, widespread uneasiness over the slow development especially in this Conference, which is a forum representing a broad cross-section of the international community. It is no wonder, therefore, that we have felt a strong need to consider possibilities of improving the effectiveness of the Conference.

It has been stated many times that unless the Conference on Disarmament is able to demonstrate progress in the near future, its very existence will be called into question. It is not this matter that worries me, it is the fate of the issues before us. There is no other multilateral forum that could negotiate the treaties which are needed. The Conference on Disarmament has demonstrated in the past that it is able to do so. There is no reason why it should not negotiate fruitfully also in the future - when the need for multilateral solutions will become even greater. The CD is a necessity and will continue to be so.

The political will to reach concrete agreements must be manifested at the negotiating table, and not only in general political declarations at various international conferences. The decision-making power obviously rests with the capitals, but there are a number of things that we can do here to facilitate the progress and the process, once the necessary political will of governments is forthcoming.

Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan is carrying out a series of open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. These consultations are very topical, since they focus on how

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the Conference on Disarmament should reform itself with a view to keeping pace with the swift changes in the international political climate. The Conference was conceived on the basis of a different political situation than we have today. It is obvious that the experiences gained over the years and the changing international situation must have an impact on the mode of functioning of the CD.

The consultations now initiated take place against the background of important contributions by the group of seven experienced colleagues. It touches upon basic issues, such as which items should be on our agenda, the functions of subsidiary bodies, working periods, etc.

My delegation will continue to take an active part in the dialogue so effectively promoted by the Chairman of the open-ended consultations. However, I also wish to take this opportunity to make a few remarks for the record on these important matters.

First, the issue of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Without prejudice to what will come out of the open-ended consultations, delegations now seem to be prepared to look at new potential items for our agenda. At the same time, however, it appears that delegations are reluctant to see existing agenda items disappear.

My delegation considers most of the items of our agenda priority issues, focusing as they do on disarmament measures pertaining to weapons of mass destruction. It is true that very little has been achieved on some of the issues over the years. To abolish them, however, would be to succumb to defeatism. One reason for the lack of progress may in some instances have been that the time has simply not been ripe to deal with them in a sufficiently constructive manner. When international security relations will now proceed to a different posture, hopefully away from a reliance on nuclear weapons, new life could perhaps be blown into these items. It should then, for instance, be possible to make progress on the question of negative security assurances.

The nuclear items on our present agenda have received very little attention in the form of structured work. After having for so many years been overdue, the nuclear test-ban issue will, however, now be treated in an ad hoc committee. The Swedish delegation welcomes this positive development. A nuclear test ban would be an unequivocal manifestation of political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to bring a halt to continued qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons. It would, furthermore, be an important contribution to efforts to prevent horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The instrumentality of a nuclear test ban in bringing about a cessation of the nuclear arms race and promoting nuclear disarmament cannot be questioned by anyone. A CTBT would be the single most important contribution to nuclear disarmament.

A nuclear test ban is of great relevance to agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". Other measures have been identified, inter alia in connection with the informal plenary meetings that have taken place this year. In some instances, similar or identical measures

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are also pertinent in the context of the prevention of nuclear war and to item 3 on our agenda. My delegation would have no difficulty in merging items 2 and 3. The essential thing is to bring about a more structured approach to these issues than hitherto. Various ideas have been discussed that could usefully be systematized by the secretariat in the form of a compilation.

Sweden has, for instance, taken up the question of naval nuclear disarmament, as well as naval confidence-building measures, under the two nuclear items just referred to. It goes without saying, however, that we would prefer to see these questions addressed as an autonomous agenda item. That would give more concerted attention to specific measures relating to naval nuclear disarmament and confidence-building measures.

My delegation is, of course, prepared to give its positive consideration also to other proposals for new agenda items. Some ideas have been presented during the informal consultations.

When it comes to the practical working methods of the Conference, my delegation is in favour of new solutions strengthening on-going negotiations. We have, therefore, supported the proposal for three sessions of the Conference as of next year, instead of the present two. This would not only give us all a chance to, at least, have one short leave during the year, but it would above all give delegations time to reflect on the on-going work, and, if need be, to receive instructions at more frequent intervals.

The Swedish delegation is also in favour of reducing the number of plenary meetings of the Conference. Moreover, we find it questionable whether it is meaningful to indicate specific topics for the plenary meetings. Delegations may wish to make omnibus statements from time to time or to address more than one subject at a time. This is especially true for statements made by visiting statesmen or government officials. Such contributions are welcome and should not be discouraged by a rigid programme of work.

It is a different matter with the subsidiary bodies. When there is a full-fledged negotiation going on, there is every reason to continue the work during the entire session. But if there is a low level of activity on a certain item, it would be better to concentrate the work in a limited number of committee meetings during a certain period. It would also make it easier to bring relevant experts to Geneva, if they were to meet only for a couple of weeks.

The Conference must not continue with the protracted consultations on the establishment of ad hoc committees that in some cases seem to have become a rule, preventing us from taking a more decisive approach to matters of substance. We must find a formula that could create a certain degree of automaticity for ad hoc committees to continue their work, once they have been established, while at the same time allowing for the potential improvement of their mandates. I realize, of course, the delicacy of the matter.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Mandates could perhaps be formulated in a more general and standardized manner than hitherto. Experience shows that the wording is not necessarily decisive. If there is a will to reach agreement on an issue, a negotiating process will evolve in the ad hoc committee in question. If, on the other hand, there is no such will, it is of little importance whether that committee has a "negotiating mandate" or not.

This is a difficult issue, since there is no consensus as to some of the tasks to be entrusted to the Conference. It should, however, be kept in mind that the Conference on Disarmament is a negotiating body, and that it must not be prevented from discharging its responsibilities. Neither must it take over the role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission as a deliberative forum.

One question where positions obviously diverge is the decision-making process of the Conference. We can, of course, not escape from the political realities outside this conference room. It would thus seem futile to undertake any major negotiation without the consent of relevant States. A delegation may, however, express that it will not prevent consensus to establish a certain ad hoc committee. The delegation in question would still be free to participate in the concrete work on the issue whenever it sees fit to do so. Such an application of the consensus rule would be conducive to progress on some important issues on the agenda.

My delegation wishes to underline the useful contributions to the work of the Conference that have been and are being made by non-members. Such participation should be encouraged and facilitated to the extent possible, not least in the perspective of promoting the prospects of universal adherence to agreements under negotiation in the Conference. Also on this question, we must devote our time and efforts to the substantive issues before us and not lose time on recurrent discussions of applications from non-member States. At least for those States and Governments which take part in the work of United Nations General Assembly or its subsidiary bodies, applications for participation as non-members in the work of the CD should be granted automatically.

The Swedish delegation has expressed its serious concern that we have not yet, after so many years, been able to settle the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. It is high time to take a concrete decision. My delegation hopes a consensus will crystallize in the very near future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, please accept the congratulations of the Mexican delegation on the way in which you have been conducting our proceedings in this month of July. We are sure that these proceedings will be successful. Permit me also to register our appreciation for the work carried out in June by Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero and the other members of the Peruvian delegation.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The history of negotiations on chemical weapons is the longest of all the multilateral disarmament negotiations. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, in spite of its limited scope, is the first instrument whereby the community of nations expressed its rejection of this kind of weapon. However, in spite of the efforts made by the Conference on Disarmament and the organs which preceded it, the international community today, 65 years later, remains without a convention totally prohibiting chemical weapons.

Without wishing to make an exhaustive inventory of the deliberations on this subject, it is worth recalling that, at the end of the 1960s, hardly had the negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons been concluded than it was recognized that verification was one of the main obstacles to the conclusion of a convention totally prohibiting chemical and biological weapons. Despite this, it is being proposed that we draw a distinction between chemical and biological weapons and negotiate an agreement which would prohibit only the latter. In introducing this proposal, document ENDC/231 of 16 August 1968, the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mulley, said:

> "I recognize that the greatest difficulty we have to face is that of verification, since understandably parties to any arms control or disarmament agreement are entitled to be reasonably satisfied to the greatest practicable extent that other parties are carrying out their obligations under the agreement. This principle is well illustrated by the safeguards requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226, article III). After much study, we have been obliged to conclude that no comparable system is possible for microbiological or chemical weapons. Any such system would be so intrusive as to be quite unacceptable, and even then could not be fully effective. The principal difficulty arises from the fact that almost all the material and equipment with which we are trying to deal have legitimate peaceful purposes; and it would be wrong to inhibit work of real value to humanity, in combating disease, for example, and impracticable to inspect every laboratory in every country. We must accept, therefore, that no verification is possible in the sense of the term as we normally use it in disarmament discussions.
>
> Thus, we must make a choice - balance the risks of evasion if we go ahead with the formulation of new obligations, against the risks for the world if we do nothing and allow the fears of eventual use of microbiological methods of warfare to continue and intensify. My choice is emphatically to go ahead; we cannot afford to do nothing. While we cannot offer a fully effective system of verification, and we believe it is beyond the wit of man to devise one, we can provide arrangements which will satisfy States, given the intractable nature of the problem, that they will not be exposing themselves to unacceptable risks."

Right from the beginning serious reservations were entered about this proposal. It was pointed out, inter alia, that it would be tantamount in practice to postponing indefinitely the total prohibition of chemical weapons. Nevertheless, three years later, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament concluded its work on the draft Convention on the Prohibition of

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the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. A few months later, the convention was to be approved by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2826(XXVI) of 16 December 1971.

The speed with which the negotiations on this Convention were concluded illustrates a very simple point: when there is political will to achieve an agreement - irrespective of the reasons that gave rise to the instrument - not even the absolute impossibility of succeeding in verifying its observance can prevent it.

Furthermore, it is a regrettable fact that today, more than 20 years after the introduction of the proposal to deal separately with chemical and biological weapons, the fears then expressed that this would be tantamount to postponing indefinitely the total prohibition of chemical weapons are being confirmed.

In spite of the changes in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, in spite of the tireless efforts of its Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius and the chairmen of the three Working Groups to advance the negotiations, both on the technical aspects and on the political aspects of the draft convention, my delegation has the impression that we are losing the impetus or "momentum" generated initially by the Paris Conference of January 1989 and strengthened by a series of international meetings which confirmed the urgency of concluding a convention totally prohibiting chemical weapons.

As we approach the end of this session of the Conference, and before we get down to the tedious task of "negotiating" the report we shall be presenting to the General Assembly, it would be worthwhile giving some thought to the reason why, on the subject on which we are focusing a high percentage of our energies - as is demonstrated by the statements in plenary, the tremendous number of working documents and the conference services assigned to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons - it would seem that we are moving further away from the original objective of attaining a convention comprehensively banning chemical weapons.

A few weeks ago, at the Washington summit, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and the means of facilitating a multilateral convention prohibiting such weapons. We hope it will shortly enter into force so that the commitment to cease production of chemical weapons will be put into effect and the process of the destruction of these weapons will begin.

The Government of Mexico has stated that it neither posseses chemical weapons nor has any intention of acquiring them. So it is difficult for us to accept that the principal possessors of chemical weapons should arrogate to themselves the right to keep a percentage of their arsenals and reserve to themselves the right of veto, to determine, eight years after it enters into force, whether participation in the multilateral convention is sufficient to proceed to the total elimination of chemical weapons. If all our countries

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were to adopt such an attitude, there would be no disarmament treaties at all. Furthermore, we were surprised at the speed with which a set of unilateral conditions contained in a footnote to a document was transformed into a bilateral understanding.

Although my delegation welcomes the fact that this agreement reflects the efforts which have for so long been going on at the multilateral level, we regret that, in referring to the negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament, there is no concurrence with the objective of attaining a comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory convention. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament should facilitate and complement each other; progress at the bilateral level should not be used to postpone or impede action at the multilateral level.

The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is embarking on the difficult process of attempting to make progress in its deliberations in what has up to now been known as the "rolling text" and which we hope will shortly be transformed into a draft convention that can be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly for adoption. We would like now to make some comments on the questions considered at this session.

The open-ended consultations on "undiminished security" have been a forum in which there has been frank debate of essential matters regarding the draft convention which is under negotiation. They have reflected the general interest in attaining a convention that would attract universal adherence and the impracticality of concepts such as that of "chemical-weapons-capable States".

The question of verification has been the subject of particular attention at this session. It has been examined both in Working Group A and in the consultations held by the Chairman of the Committee on article IX of the draft convention. In this regard, we believe that, although certain details still need refining, the "rolling text" already contains the fundamental elements of an adequate verification régime.

In this context, the initiatives aimed at seeking perfection in the verification régime could be interpreted as delaying tactics or lack of political will to conclude the negotiations on the draft convention. We were therefore surprised that the delegation of the United Kingdom should have stressed that we should not take the easy way out, that we should not follow the example of the Biological Weapons Convention, and that verification has the highest priority.

Of course, verification is a basic element in agreements on arms limitation and disarmament, but the conclusion of negotiations on the total prohibition of chemical weapons should not be subject to the perfecting ad infinitum of the verification régime. Ad infinitum would mean in this case ad Kalendas Graecas.

Verification of compliance is intimately linked with States parties' perceptions of security. The climate of détente and greater openness and transparency has already begun to have positive effects on our deliberations,

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as is shown by the growing acceptance of the concept of "challenge inspections". My delegation hopes that the bold initiative of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in presenting a proposal for article IX as a whole will enable the deliberations on this question to advance. We also hope that the consultations by Ambassador García Moritán on article X, concerning assistance and protection against chemical weapons, will, in the medium term, enable the text to be transferred to Appendix I. In addition, we regret that article XI, concerning economical and technological co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities, should not have been the subject of the slightest consideration at this session.

Once again the Committee has opened its doors to representatives of the chemical industry for an exchange of views, both on the content of the draft convention and on the implications of its future application to activities of the chemical industry for civilian purposes. The frank dialogue which characterized those sessions of the Committee and the Industry Statement adopted within the content of the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons held in Canberra in September last year revealed the broad support of the chemical industry for the conclusion of our negotiations.

In so far as possible, the negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament will continue to give attention to the concerns expressed by the industrial representatives, but we should not forget that the fundamental objective of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons is the strengthening of the security of States, and not the protection of industrial interests. In any case, we should also bear in mind that trade unions in the chemical industry have begun to show interest in our negotiations, and we believe that the Committee should examine the comments that they have made on our draft convention.

In a few days the Committee will conclude its work so that the secretariat can begin the processing of the report that will be included in the one we shall be submitting to the United Nations General Assembly. My delegation fears that this report will not respond satisfactorily to the expectations expressed in resolutions 44/115 A and B and 44/119 D.

At times it might seem that the topic of chemical weapons is the only one on our agenda. In fact it does constitute the most immediate challenge to the credibility of the work of the Conference on Disarmament as a multilateral negotiating body for disarmament agreements.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Permit me to extend to you, Sir, the satisfaction of my delegation at the way in which you have been conducting our proceedings. Once again you have demonstrated the same diplomatic skills as when you were Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. As always you can count on the collaboration of my delegation.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

During the first part of this year's session, the Argentine delegation devoted a statement in plenary to agenda item 5, namely "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

On that occasion, we shared with the delegations here some thoughts and pointed out that, in the circumstances obtaining, the evolution of the international situation and the dynamics of the Conference on Disarmament made clear the existence of undeniable potential for using confidence-building measures as a multilateral means of generating a climate of co-operation in the utilization and exploitation of outer space and perhaps also as an effective instrument for delaying or at least rendering less likely the onset of an arms race in space.

Drawing an analogy with the successful negotiating process under way in Vienna in the European regional context, we ventured to suggest the possibility of jointly shaping a régime which we christened the "Helsinki/Stockholm" of outer space, in an allusion to the capitals that have lent their names to two documents on confidence-building measures that in a sense constitute a model of transparency which we believe to be possible at the multilateral level.

Since that statement, the summit meeting in Washington last month and the meetings of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have confirmed us in our belief that the path of transparency and mutual confidence can and should be utilized to its fullest possible extent.

In the case of outer space, this can take a number of forms. The Ad hoc Committee which is carrying out its work under the efficient and dedicated chairmanship of Canada has before it a series of specific proposals aimed at the same objective. All, in addition to their intrinsic merits, share the same approach to the agenda item, whether the proposal is to establish a code of conduct for space activities or a trajectography centre or to strengthen certain existing instruments in the present legal régime.

In that connection, my delegation wishes now to refer in some detail to a proposal which it has put forward in the Ad hoc Committee and which in fact conforms to a tradition of proposals that focused on the same point, namely the possibility of strengthening the régime established by the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. In this connection, we shall be circulating document CD/1015, which will also be circulated as a working paper of the Ad hoc Committee.

As we all know, the Registration Convention arose from the need to give precise and concrete effect to the considerations already present in a very general way in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. In a practical sense, it also supplemented the provisions of the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects.

In brief, it is an instrument which, if it cannot be described as directly linked to disarmament or arms limitation, undeniably falls within the corpus of space law. From the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 1721 A (XVI), 1884 (XVIII) and 1962 (XVIII), this body of law

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

displays an internal coherence and an interrelationship in its objectives, among which the use of outer space for the benefit and in the interests of the international community figures prominently.

Thus, the Registration Convention, by providing specific information about the nature and functions of objects launched into outer space, constitutes a de facto and indispensable data base for any subsequent development designed to generate confidence in the uses of outer space.

To deny in this sense the indisputable authority of the Registration Convention as a security measure would, in my opinion, simply be to ignore the nature of the instrument or, what is worse, to fail as a State party to comply with its provisions.

The Convention was drawn up on the premise, which we now recognize as wholly valid, that full knowledge of the presence of objects in outer space would bring about the necessary pre-conditions for the peaceful, harmonious and rational use of that environment. It was thought at the time that a limited number of unilateral obligations to provide information would be sufficient to give practical effect to that idea.

Article IV of the Registration Convention established a criterion on the basis of five elements of information: name of launching State; designator or registration number of the space object; date and location of launch; basic orbital parameters (nodal period, inclination, apogee and perigee); general function of the space object. It was also stipulated that all this information should be provided, as the Convention puts it, "as soon as practicable".

In this way, the Convention provided a basic technical framework. The instrument itself constituted an undeniable achievement, since the international community at that stage lacked an organized body of information on the subject. The beginnings of a legal structure, or at least an institutionalized judicial framework for achieving it, had thus been defined.

The practical results fell far short of even the most modest hopes which had been entertained. The flow of information generated as a result of the application of the Convention proved to be scanty, incomplete and tardy, being entirely dependent upon the will of the State which was to provide it and there was no possibility of encouraging States parties to the registration régime to comply more fully with the terms of the Agreement.

Thus, the absurd situation was reached that for many years not a single military-type mission was reported, although it is fully acknowledged today that the majority of activities in outer space are directly or indirectly associated with operations of a military nature.

The adoption of a minimalist formulation and the express granting in the text of the Convention of almost total discretion through the use of the expression "as soon as practicable" in fact neutralized an instrument whose potential remains enormous.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

Specifically, the régime should be strengthened in two ways. First, in respect of the scope of the information and secondly, with regard to its timeliness.

On the matter of scope, we would refer to the terms of article IV, paragraph 1 (e). We think that States parties should specify rather more than the "general function" of the space object - a criterion which makes it possible in theory to classify a military reconnaisance satellite as, for example, a communication satellite.

It is clear that a more precise register would be useful as a basis, for example, for the subsequent formulation of régimes to protect satellites used for civilian or even selected military purposes, bearing in mind its stabilizing effect.

It should be stressed that there is no reason why a more detailed description should affect the confidential nature of a mission or its effectiveness if there is an appropriate definition of what criteria constitute a complete and satisfactory general description of the functions of a space object.

With regard to other types of additional information, we believe that the definition of common criteria could be entrusted to a group of governmental experts under the auspices of the Conference through its Ad hoc Committee.

Turning now to the timeliness with which information is provided, it is clear that the terms in which the Convention is currently couched make it possible for information to come in late or even never, which is indeed the more probable.

A political decision appropriately supported on scientific and technical level must determine what are the acceptable time-limits in order to make the Convention useful and operational. This does not imply that the information must be provided before the launch. The time-limit for notification and the scope of information could be defined in each case in accordance with the nature and functions of the object to be launched.

To sum up, my delegation considers that a strengthening of the Registration Convention would not only better adapt that instrument to its original objectives, but also make it an important additional element for confidence-building and transparency in the peaceful uses of outer space.

In addition, it would have positive effects which complement other proposals before the Conference, such as those relating to the definition of a code of conduct on space activities, which require as a basic pre-condition a reliable and systematic survey of objects launched into outer space.

Last week the Conference had the welcome opportunity to receive Ambassador Burt and Ambassador Nazarkin, who presented a detailed diagnosis and prognosis of the negotiations which the United States and the Soviet Union are conducting on nuclear and space matters.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

On the subject of defence and outer space, we received confirmation once again that, unfortunately, in this area differences continue to be considerable and that, for the moment, no agreement is in sight. Nevertheless, from the information received it emerges clearly that perhaps the only sector in the context of the Space and Defense Talks in which there has been some progress is that of the drafting of a "Protocol on Predictability Measures" which will include an exchange of information, inspection of laboratories, etc.

The measures proposed by the United States delegation are focused on activities associated with the space programme of that country which might cause concern or mistrust on the part of the Soviet Union.

It is our belief that if on the bilateral level there is effective progress on initiatives such as that described, nothing should stand in the way of strengthening on the multilateral level an instrument like the Registration Convention, which undoubtedly supplements the criterion and the stated goals of a measure such as the one the United States has proposed in its bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union.

If, as we believe, the criterion is the same and if the objectives coincide, everything is in place to embark on some concrete steps.

Our proposal seeks no more or less than to be a step forward.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for its statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. I should like to ask if any other delegation wishes to take the floor at this stage. I see none.

I have requested the secretariat to circulate today the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. As usual, the timetable has been the subject of consultations with the chairmen of subsidiary bodies. It is merely indicative and can be changed if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

I have no other business for today and I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 24 July, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.567
24 July 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 24 July 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Bogumil Sujka (Poland)

GE.90-62358/2213B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 567th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As the Conference has received requests from non-member States to participate in our work, once the list of speakers is exhausted, we shall hold an informal meeting in order to consider those requests. We shall immediately afterwards resume the plenary meeting to formalize any decisions arrived at in the informal meeting. I should like to recall also that, after the plenary proceedings are concluded, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Egypt.

I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kosin.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, may I, at the outset, tell you how pleased I am to see you, my personal friend and outstanding representative of friendly Poland, as the President of the Conference of Disarmament for the month of July. Under your skilful presidency the Conference has made an important step forward in the area of nuclear issues and the deliberations in general went on smoothly and fruitfully. Please do accept my delegation's warmest congratulations. At this juncture, I would like to express my gratitude to your predecessor, Ambasador de Rivero, of Peru, who so efficiently led the Conference in June. I am taking the opportunity to welcome in our midst the heads of delegations of Brazil, Ambassador Ricupero; of India, Ambassador Chadha; and of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Wagner, and to assure them that they can count on the full co-operation of the Yugoslav delegation. I would also like to express our gratitude to our outgoing colleagues, Ambassador Sharma, Ambassador Bayart, Ambassador Kostov and Ambassador Varga, who all contributed so much to the work of our Conference. I wish them all the best in the future.

The Yugoslav delegation has on several occasions presented its views on the need for a faster shift from arms control to the stage of disarmament measures on all levels of negotiations, in accordance with the positive evolution of international relations.

Of priority importance to my delegation are the developments on the European continent that provide conditions for the interweaving of fundamental values outlined within the Conference on European Security and Co-operation on which relations among European countries should be based. Too much is happening at the same time in the social, inter-State, inter-bloc and intra-bloc relations for us to be able to predict all the aspects of immediate development. However, it could be said that Europe, so far the most divided and most armed continent, has shifted towards multifaceted co-operation, thus

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becoming the key element of general efforts aimed at changing the entirety of international relations. Such an evolution, although its numerous aspects and processes are still at the beginning, is already creating a new reality in the world. This new reality creates a foundation for the elaboration of a more active strategy towards redefining new security concepts in all their important postulates, including the nuclear deterrent, the arms race, and so forth.

It is in this light that we see more favourable conditions for accelerating the pace towards disarmament. Such an assessment is continually being reaffirmed. Although we may differ in opinion as to the extent to which the last summit between the two big Powers has met all our expectations, it seems to us that it basically confirmed the continuity in the disarmament negotiations intentions. We welcome the general accord to conclude, in the near future, agreements on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, on the limitation of nuclear testing, on the obligation to destroy the bulk of chemical arsenals, on the halting of chemical arms production, on the intensification of negotiations on conventional weapons in Europe, etc. These accords can give strong impulse to the work of our Conference. Although, in our view, less was achieved than had been announced, we wish to believe that the horizon is more clear and that the most important disarmament agreements are at hand's reach. We are heartened by the information offered us by the distinguished Ambassadors, Mr. Burt and Mr. Nazarkin, on bilateral negotiations.

The consensus reached on a number of fundamental issues on the United Nations Disarmament Commission's agenda is encouraging, although it is far below the need of multilateral negotiations. We would like to discern here a more positive attitude to multilateral negotiations in general, which in an improved international climate, should be adjusted to the rhythm of bilateral and regional negotiations. This can primarily be done by making use of the potentials of the Conference. The need for this is ever more felt as the international negotiating agenda on disarmament is expanding to new fields. Therefore, we see no reason why we should not start thinking about our agenda too, which can be done without having to question real priorities. I say "real" not because they are written out in our decalogue, or in the final document of SSOD I, but because in their greater part they are still topical. We would want, for example, conventional weapons and confidence-building measures to be given more attention in our future debate on the Conference's agenda.

While not ignoring any problem on the agenda, our efforts, in the immediate work of our Conference, should continue to be focused on three priority questions, namely, items 1, 4 and 5. By treating these questions in a substantial way, and by making real progress, we can strengthen the role of the Conference. We support, of course, all the efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the Conference by improving its method of work and its organization. However, our credibility will depend, first of all, on how capable we are in solving problems which are ripe for it, in clarifying that which should be clarified as soon as possible and in defining that which should be defined. In doing so we must always keep in mind that our Conference is a negotiating body, the ultimate aim of which is the dialogue on all negotiating, pre-negotiating and deliberative levels, leading to the concluding of disarmament agreements.

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Among these priorities come the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons, as most promising in being resolved. We believe we are now in a truly critical phase, which cannot even stand slowing down without risking to fall back. We ask ourselves why, after obvious progress in 1987 and 1988, after repeated political impulses from numerous international gatherings in 1989 and 1990, the negotiating pace seems to have been more or less slowed down. Having in mind that the complexity of problems requires workable and durable solutions, we are finding it more and more difficult to see where we now stand. Political consensus is constantly being renewed, commitment of intentions reaffirmed, convergence of views is permanently evolving, the position of main possessors and producers of chemical weapons are practically identical, and still we have the impression we are turning in circles and, at times, even that which seemed agreed upon is questioned.

We do not yet have answers to these questions and they might even be too critically intoned. We have to start, however, asking them instead of being satisfied with marginal advances. This has to be done the more as we believe that the participation of a greater number of non-member States in negotiations, an improved mandate of the Committee itself, the submission of important bilateral documents on the destruction of chemical weapons and production capacities, the generalization of efforts in carrying out trial inspection, the convening of fruitful meetings with chemical industrial representatives - create a realistic basis for speedier work.

We see the two big Powers' agreement on the gradual elimination of chemical weapons and the halting of their production as a confirmation of their orientation towards concluding the multilateral convention we are negotiating in the Conference on Disarmament. The ambiguity on retaining the last stage of destruction of all arsenals poses, however, a number of questions related to the conceptual basis and security purpose of the convention. With no aim of questioning the proclaimed intention whereby such ambiguity serves as an incentive to achieve the convention's universality, we are inclined to believe that in practice it will serve as an incentive to the production and even proliferation of chemical weapons. It is needless to repeat that this will pose many problems related to the security of a number of countries.

The universality of a convention is, of course, vital. It will be effectively achieved only if we offer the international community a good, that is global, undiscriminatory and verifiable convention, acceptable to all countries, first of all from the point of view of undiminished security. The most important element in making it acceptable is precisely an unambiguous engagement towards a total elimination and unconditional ban on chemical weapons.

We feel that the conditions are ripe for the Committee's programme of work to be more intensively focused on those questions that have not yet been sufficiently or that have been reviewed only in passing. Here we refer to questions relating to a precise definition of chemical weapons and all that relates to production plants. It is only on the basis of such definitions that we can secure confidence-building when declaring chemical weapons and production plants. Such definitions are indispensable also in negotiations on the character and scope of verification, as they would indicate what type of

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inspection should be carried out in a given plant. The interesting exchange of opinions at meetings with industry representatives on ad hoc verification, confidentiality and schedules of chemicals are a good basis for work on these questions. This is why we would urge the Ad hoc Committee to speed up negotiations on all of these questions, which would also quicken negotiations on the role, composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council.

Political problems relating to assistance, to protection in case of use or threat of use of chemical weapons and to economic and technological development require immediate action. It is high time also that the President's proposal be taken into more articulate discussion as an already elaborated basis for an agreement on the key issue in article IX. In fact, the division between political and technical questions is only conditional, since that which can seem to be a minor technical question to one country, to another may be an extremely relevant one for its development and future.

In spite of all the uncertainties, the situation can be viewed with certain optimism. I wish to point out that Yugoslavia intends to be an original signatory of the convention.

I believe there is no need to repeat the significance of the Conference's engagement in dealing substantially with the problem of nuclear testing - especially now, in the context of the Fourth NPT Review Conference, which cannot circumvent either element of the non-proliferation régime, including cessation of testing, peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy, nuclear disarmament and so on. As has been repeated several times, the complete cessation of testing, that is the conclusion of a CTBT, would be the most effective single measure in checking the nuclear arms race, the most secure and the shortest way towards nuclear disarmament and the slowing down of the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. In connection with this we should underline the significant work already done by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts on enhancing verification by elaborating a global system of seismic verification, and which is also prepared to test the system's new verification techniques.

The signing of the Protocols on Verification of the so-called threshold agreement is, of course, a measure we welcome. These gradual steps have, however, to be put in a context of predictable advance towards the conclusion of the agreement on a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests in any environment and for all time. Unfortunately, such an objective has not yet been accepted by all nuclear Powers.

We highly welcome the agreement on setting up the Ad hoc Committee on a NTB, as the culmination of year-long efforts to have the Conference take part in resolving this key issue of nuclear disarmament and so confirm its role in treating nuclear issues. We are grateful to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, who, together with Ambassador Yamada, successfully carried out consultations which led to a reasonably balanced mandate.

The Conference is a representative enough body that cannot avoid its responsibility in treating this problem, especially now when the time of deep re-evaluation of all military and defence doctrines has begun. We are convinced that the Conference can give a significant contribution to this

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issue in spite of the differences of opinions. We hope that the founding of the Committee will be an opportunity for a genuine debate on this key issue. The mandate itself offers a sufficient framework for a well-structured exchange of views as a basis for next year's substantial work. We believe that this exchange of views should not be a repetition of well-known positions on nuclear disarmament, but a focused, substantial discussion on specific, concrete aspects of the nuclear test ban.

For five years already, in its Committee, the Conference has been dealing with the problem of preventing the arms race in outer space. The results are not only modest, but it is hard to qualify them even as symbolic. We do not wish to underestimate the quality of the debate, the significance of proposals submitted, the clarification of certain problems, but neither to overlook the fact that we are lagging behind the development of space technologies and that there is an increasing number of countries capable of participating in the conquest of space. We are in fact only at the very beginning of a substantial treatment of this complex issue, while very important proposals requiring urgent consideration such as, for example, those relating to the ban of ASAT weapons, satellite immunity, etc., are going past us.

If we cannot take an essential step forward towards full negotiations, we have to do our utmost to at least orient ourselves in two ways. The first would be an elaboration of confidence-building measures, since experience has shown that there, where we cannot negotiate disarmament measures, we can undertake serious preparatory steps through enhancing confidence and security. Many ideas have already been generated in this field such as the proposal to establish "a code of conduct for space activities", for example. The second would be the strengthening of the existing, but insufficient, legal régime, which would, inter alia, lead to avoiding the development and deployment of space weapons and cover measures of verification. The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, providing specific information about the nature of these objects, should be enhanced both in scope and function.

We welcome the participation of experts in the Committee's work, which raises the debate to a higher level and certainly contributes to a comprehensive understanding of this complex issue.

There are many ideas and proposals in circulation, so that the Committee can as from now embark, without exaggerated ambition, on substantive work, on those problems ripe to be multilaterally considered.

In conclusion, I would wish to point out that this is not a complete review of problems but an effort to see, in the light of the positive evolution in the world, which roads we can, gradually but continually, follow to reach our goals and to see better what our prospects are. Our Conference is a negotiating body on disarmament, but it can and, indeed, must participate also in the elaboration of security concepts and be part of the process of increased institutionalization of international relations. Political processes normally precede disarmament, but disarmament efforts should not stay far behind, as they are inseparable from international relations. If we want to advance on all fronts, then we must give meaning to the contents of

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proclaimed positions on the interaction, interdependence and complementarity of all negotiating efforts, be they bilateral, regional, subregional or multilateral ones.

This is why it does not suffice that we merely keep each other informed, but we have to simultaneously and meaningfully engage ourselves in all areas. Commitments of intentions must become commitments to results. Every effort should have support, but it should also be expanded and enlarged to meet the needs of the entire international community. That is the case with, for example, non-proliferation of chemical weapons and missile technology agreements, for which true solutions can be found only in a wider disarmament context. They cannot be an aim in themselves, not because the aims are debatable, but to avoid uneven responsibility and security.

The effort towards disarmament is today greater and more fundamental than ever in the post-war period, and even perhaps in the entire history of international relations. This is why through more intensive efforts a new dynamic should be generated in accomplishing the true role of the Conference in what can already be qualified as a permanent negotiating effort.

THE PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Mr. Chirila.

Mr. CHIRILA (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. President, permit me first of all to say how gratified the Romanian delegation is to see you presiding, with such competence and diplomacy, over the work of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. Our gratification is all the greater as you represent Poland, a country with which Romania has traditional relations of friendship and co-operation and, in both the distant and the recent past, often similar experience.

There is already every sign that you will be discharging the duties of President under the very best, if not ideal, conditions. In this context, I cannot let this moment go without stressing, for example, the special significance of the establishment during your term as President of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban under the chairmanship of Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, whose talents in this respect have so often been emphasized here.

I am delighted to be able to welcome to our midst the heads of delegation who have recently joined the Conference, including Ambassador Králik of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ambassador von Wagner of the Federal Republic of Germany and Ambassador Chadha of India. It is with regret and appreciation that we bade farewell to the heads of delegation who have recently left the Conference.

My statement at today's plenary meeting is prompted by the distribution, under the symbol CD/1014, of a working paper with data concerning Romania on matters of relevance to an issue that is the subject of intensive negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament, the future universal convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

Delegations now have the document before them. This working paper submitted by our delegation, like other texts containing information on the same topic that have already been submitted by other delegations, reflects the desire of Romania too to contribute to confidence-building and the acceleration of the negotiating process. That is not to say that we are necessarily in favour of a protracted "pre-convention" process: it might, as is already being said, cause us to lose the rhythm or even miss the right moment.

The information that we are presenting in document CD/1014 follows closely the lines of document CD/828, which since April 1988, when it was submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, has provided the reference framework for those undertaking this exercise of more direct contact between the national context and the international context of the problem prior to the realization of the convention.

Our document is divided into two parts. The first part is a compilation of information that is both concise and clear and reiterates declarations that Romania has already made to the Conference, in particular in my statement of 13 February this year. In substance, it says that Romania does not possess chemical weapons, that there are no such weapons on its territory and that my country has no intention of producing or acquiring them either now or in the future. In this context, permit me to remind you that on 19 April this year we also made in the plenary of the Conferene a declaration of Romania's complete readiness to be an original signatory of a universal convention totally banning chemical weapons.

The second part of the working paper submitted by my delegation provides full data on the production, use, import and export of chemical products in Romania. It will be clearly seen that in Romania there is no production of, or, in general, any performance of operations with substances listed in Schedules 1 or 2 of the "rolling text" of the draft convention.

As for Schedule 3, Romania produces 7 substances in 11 plants, in amounts of between 30 and 9,000 tonnes a year. All these products are intended for use within the country as intermediates in the manufacture of medicines, colourings, pesticides and other products of the civilian chemical industry. The document provides information on location and information on production and rated capacities. The data on imports and exports shows that production of the seven substances in question is undertaken solely for internal, civilian use.

Even with a chemical industry which is not on a level with the countries that are highly developed in this sphere, Romania is aware of the responsibilities that it will have to bear in the international system to implement and verify the future universal chemical weapons ban. I would like to take this opportunity to inform the Conference that to a certain extent, with the means currently available, the Romanian authorities have already taken some measures to set up a group of experts who could, when the time comes, take on the activities of a national authority with specific responsibilities for the implementation of, and compliance with the obligations deriving from the future convention. Moreover, we believe that

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the working paper that Romania has submitted to the Conference today could well provide a starting point for the national register advocated in the draft convention.

Finally, I wish to emphasize that we are ready to co-operate with all States or international bodies in increasing confidence and transparency in this highly sensitive area, inter alia through the training of specialists in the field of verification for a universal chemical weapons ban.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Grozdanov.

Mr. GROZDANOV (Bulgaria): I have asked for the floor in order to make a very brief statement in connection with the circulation of document CD/1017. But before proceeding, may I be allowed to extend to you, Ambassador Sujka, the warm congratulations of my delegation on seeing you in the Chair during the busiest time of the summer session. My delegation would also like to express its appreciation for the work done by your predecessor, Ambassador de Rivero of Peru, in the month of June.

As delegations must be aware, today my delegation has tabled an official document of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Submission of data in connection with the Convention of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons". The provision of this data by the Bulgarian Government is intended as a confidence-building measure and is an expression of its profound desire to stimulate negotiation on the speedy conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

The contents of document CD/1017 speak for themselves. Bulgaria does not have chemical weapons on its territory, either its own or stocks of another party, and has only one chemical, hydrogen cyanide, that falls under the projected scope of the convention.

However, under instructions from my Government, I avail myself of this opportunity to state once again the readiness of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to sign the future chemical weapons convention as soon as it is open for signature. We believe that such statements enhance the prospects for a timely solution of the remaining outstanding issues in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and we expect similar moves by all other States concerned.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt.

Mr. KAREM (Egypt): On behalf of Ambassador Elaraby, I would like to make the following statement:

"I have asked for the floor to make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21, but since this is the first time I take the floor during this month, allow me to express my heartfelt congratulations to you for

(Mr. Karem, Egypt)

assuming the presidency during the month of July. I am confident, Mr. President, that under your able and experienced leadership the work of the Conference on Disarmament is in good hands. At the same time, I would like to express to Ambassador de Rivero of Peru and to the delegation of Peru our sincere appreciation for providing able leadership during the month of June. Now I would like to make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21 and the statement reads as follows:

'The Group of 21 takes note of the bilateral agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons signed on 1 June 1990. It considers the decision by the USSR and the United States of America to halt the production of chemical weapons and to start the destruction of their declared chemical weapons stockpiles to be an important and positive step. The Group hopes that this agreement will enter into force in the near future.

However, the Group of 21 regrets the proposed revisions to the present draft convention as contained in CD/CW/WP.303, which will have negative effects because they inter alia put conditions and postpone the decision for the total elimination of chemical weapons, give rights to States based on the possession of chemical weapons and create a situation of legal uncertainty about the scope and the implementation of the multilateral convention. The Group emphasizes that the ultimate goal must be a non-discriminatory convention of universal adherence.

The Group of 21 is convinced that the bilateral agreement should not be the model for a multilateral treaty and believes that there should be no deviation from the principal undertakings in the present draft convention. In this regard, the Group of 21 is of the view that the total destruction of all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities should be unconditional and decided from the very conclusion of the convention, as already provided for in the present draft convention, so that by the end of the 10-year destruction period all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities would be totally eliminated. This undertaking should be without any reservation.

The Group of 21 reaffirms its position that the future convention on chemical weapons should prohibit the use of such weapons under any circumstances from the date the convention enters into force. This undertaking is already provided for in article I, paragraph 3, of the draft convention.

The Group of 21 opposes any measures which are aimed at establishing a non-proliferation régime in the field of chemical weapons. In its view, non-proliferation in all its aspects can only be achieved through a total and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons'.

That concludes the statement on behalf of the Group of 21".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement on behalf of the Group of 21, as well as for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

I recognize the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation has asked for the floor to clarify certain matters relating to the bilateral Soviet-American agreement on chemical weapons mentioned today by a number of speakers.

First of all, I would like to express our gratification at the fact that, in the statement by the Group of 21, such key provisions in the bilateral agreement as the obligations not to manufacture chemical weapons and to destroy a considerable part of the stocks of these weapons in so far as concerns the USSR and the United States, are viewed as both important and positive. The Soviet delegation shares the hope of the Group of 21 that the bilateral agreement can come into force in the near future.

To contribute towards this, we intend to make every effort for the possible elaboration together with the United States delegation of the documents which are provided for in this bilateral agreement, and in particular the document on inspection procedures.

Permit me to refer now to the proposals contained in the document CD/CW/WP.303. The Soviet delegation shares the view expressed by the distinguished representative of Egypt on behalf of the Group of 21 that as the ultimate goal we must aim at a convention on chemical weapons that is non-discriminatory in nature and universal as regards the range of the parties to it.

But it is precisely to the attainment of that goal that the proposals contained in document CD/CW/WP.303 are directed. We may differ in our views about how best to reach this ultimate goal, what course to take towards it, but as regards the goal itelf, there, I think, there are no differences at all.

I would like to stress too that the proposals contained in this document are already a compromise between what one would think to be irreconcilable positions held by the parties. It is, probably, an axiom that each of us is almost always more pleased by his own initial position, than by the compromise that is reached when positions are merged. But, you know, the essence and the drama of negotiations both lie in the fact that reaching agreements inevitably entails sacrificing positions that seem to us beyond reproach.

In any case, we are for the serious discussion of this proposal and its various aspects and the finding of a mutually acceptable solution.

I do, however, feel that we would be avoiding unnecessary polemics if from the very outset there is some clarity: this proposal does not affect the obligation of complete destruction of chemical weapons set out, as you know, in article I of the draft convention.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

The Soviet delegation would like to confirm its position in favour of an unconditional ban on the use of chemical weapons within the framework of the draft of the future convention.

In conclusion, I think it necessary to emphasize that, as has already repeatedly been declared by the Soviet delegation, by the Soviet Union, including together with the United States, the best long-term solution to the problem of the spread of chemical weapons is, in our view, the conclusion of the convention that we are working on here, that is, a convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I would just like to make a few brief remarks also directed to the statement we have just heard from the spokesman for the Group of 21. Like my Soviet colleague, the United States has very similar reactions to the comments by the Group of 21 on the bilateral agreement reached between the United States and the USSR in Washington on 1 June. We welcome the comments in the Group of 21 statement which express acceptance and recognition of, I believe the words were, "important and positive" elements in the bilateral agreement, but we also regret that some of the other conclusions seem to be based on misunderstandings or misinterpretations of the intent or of the projected result of what it is we are proposing in CD/CW/WP.303. The United States has asked for an opportunity, hopefully some time during this week and in co-operation with the Soviet Union, to explain in more direct detail what is the purpose and what is the intent of our proposals, especially with regard to the eighth-year review conference and the 98 per cent pause. We hope to have that opportunity, as I indicated, in the very near future. In my association with Ambassador Batsanov's remarks, that does not include his remarks about retaliatory use.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

Distinguished representatives, as announced earlier, we shall now suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting to consider requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11 a.m. and resumed at 11.05 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 567th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

May I invite the Conference to take action on document CD/WP.389 relating to the requests from two non-member States to participate in our work. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision contained in the note by the President. I hear no objection.

It was so decided.

(The President)

In connection with this decision, I wish to note for the record that the statement made by the President of the Conference at the resumed 534th plenary meeting also applies to the two requests that we have just considered.

I would like to inform you that, owing to some technical reasons of an organizational nature, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances has asked me to inform you that the meeting initially scheduled for Thursday, 26 July, after the plenary meeting, is being postponed until Monday, 30 July, at 3 p.m. The conference room will be indicated in the timetable for next week.

I have no other business for today. Before I adjourn, I should like to recall that after this plenary meeting the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 26 July, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.568
26 July 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 26 July 1990, at 10. a.m.

President: Mr. Bogumil Sujka (Poland)

GE.90-62364/2211B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 568th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Netherlands and Indonesia. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Wagenmakers.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): On 6 February 1990, at the opening session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs qualified the year 1989 as the year that marked the end of the post-war era. Indeed, 1989 was, in view of so many major political changes in Europe, a truly revoluntionary year. It is equally true that 1990 is the year in which a new architecture, and not just for Europe, will continue to take shape. The historical landmarks for that architecture seem to have been erected only recently. States have literally opened up and become receptive to a host of ideas and concepts, some old, some new. The internal developments in many European countries have had an immediate bearing on the perception of foreign and security policies. Seldom has a year been so fruitful as 1990, and we are only halfway through: the summit in Washington, the bilateral agreements between the United States and the USSR, the development towards German unification, the historic NATO meetings and their communiqués, the possibilities of agreements later this year on conventional forces in Europe as well as on confidence- and security-building measures, a CSCE summit and the strong probability that at the end of this year an agreement on strategic offensive arms will be signed by the Soviet Union and the United States.

From a global perspective, over recent years the enhanced role of the United Nations is clearly in evidence: effectively settling bloody conflicts which hitherto seemed not susceptible to mediation: the independence of Namibia, to mention just one example. Peace is breaking out, although regrettably not yet everywhere. Unfortunately, we witness areas of antagonism shifting from the East-West context into the third world. Proliferation of major weapon systems, be it conventional, chemical or of other types, is a worrisome corollary of that trend. In general, however, antagonism is yielding place to co-operation and trust. The threats to international security are diminishing, the international community can henceforth gradually start to focus its efforts on allocation of scarce resources to other objectives.

How does this rapidly changing environment affect the Conference on Disarmament? That is the first question I shall take up today. Secondly, what are the implications for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear arms and testing issues? Thirdly, I intend to address our chemical weapons negotiations.

(Mr. Wagenmakers (Netherlands)

How then, to take up the first question, how then does the Conference on Disarmament avail itself of the historic opportunities offered in this revoluntionary age? Our awareness was first raised - this year - by the important message of Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil on 8 February last. Many plenary statements since then have echoed his appeal.

Indeed, if we, in this forum, do not use up the full potential of the moment, there would be the real danger of losing the connection with political developments outside the CD, the link with reality to which the leader of the delegation of the Soviet Union referred so intriguingly the other day. I will not indulge in any speculation whether we have or have not, so far sufficiently grasped the opportunities which have presented themselves. What is more important is that we remain continuously alert to the possibilities which occur and that we do not shy away from the fact that dealing with reality is an infinitely more difficult and complex task than elaborating and stating theoretical goals. It is our task to grasp the immense potential of the moment. We should not allow ourselves to hang on to ossified ideas and thereby lose opportunities.

The fact that the CD has engaged in a realistic effort to streamline our negotiating schedules is warmly welcomed by the Netherlands. A better streamlining of our meeting schedules, which we always advocated, is, however, not an end in itself. What counts is that, as a result of such rescheduling, there will be increased possibility for consultations in our capitals and for going about our business on the basis of fresh instructions and ideas.

On another score we should not be loath to take a hard look at our agenda and the programme of work. Why not, pragmatically, decide to discontinue an endless round of unproductive meetings on a certain subject-matter if and when positions persistently remain too far apart for consensus to emerge? If we did so for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, why not do so for other intractable issues? Like other delegations, mine is not convinced that the existence of agenda items 2 and 3 as separate entities is conducive to the structured approach these issues would warrant. My delegation is equally convinced that we should not shirk creative thinking on new topics for an agenda such as confidence-building measures and conventional and/or regional disarmament. I listened with great interest to what our distinguished colleague from Yugoslavia had to say on that score in our 567th meeting. Another topic, depending on the outcome of the BW Review Conference in 1991, may be biological weapons as well. Existing subjects, such as arms control in outer space, could, circumstances permitting, be viewed with a fresh look to identify areas of progress.

We welcome the increasing attendance and participation of observer countries. Indeed, some active observers have more impact on the negotiations than some CD members. Hopefully, the procedure applied this year for the admission of non-members can be followed again next year. Indeed, full participation in our day-to-day negotiations by those non-members who desire it constitutes an important element for achieving universality of disarmament agreements.

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Another matter, of equal importance, is that the CD has yet to implement its long-standing decision to expand its membership by four countries. Somehow, the implementation of this decision got thwarted. In order to get out of the present limbo, partial implementation of the 1984 decision seems called for, pending finalization of the choice of candidates of some groups.

It is to be welcomed that the thrust of many interventions in the CD this year has shown a fair degree of consensus on the necessity for this Conference to adapt to changing circumstances and priorities. The fact that this took some time in no way worries me. After all, we can only negotiate on the basis of consensus. If more radical change happens in the CD, then it will be both because of a then existing political will and because of a long preceding period of thought and preparation.

In the East-West context, member States of NATO and Warsaw Pact have shown themselves receptive to change. From being former opponents, they now consider joint statements on non-aggression and discuss a new security concept resulting in a defensive posture on both sides. But practical action too is envisaged. In this context I can mention specifically the Netherlands/Polish CFE trial inspection. If former adversaries can do so, we in the CD, partners in negotiations and consultations, should be able to sit down and tackle constructively the various issues which still divide us, be they global, regional or intraregional.

How, then, do these changes affect our work on the nuclear issues in the CD? The States assembled in the CD agree on the desirable outcome of a number of issues, for example nuclear disarmament. All of us agree that eventually we should reach the goal of a peaceful and stable world free of nuclear arms. We may disagree about the approach towards this goal and the determination of the political circumstances which will have to prevail for all States if they are indeed to engage in such far reaching nuclear disarmament.

Radical solutions rarely promote stability and this applies just as much, if not especially, to the case of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons were and are, in the East-West context, essential components in an extremely complex security equation. That equation was more or less stable over a long period of time, but is now changing fast. The consequences of that change are not clear as yet, but the role of nuclear weapons in our defence will certainly become less prominent. For example, in their recent London summit Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance (document CD/1013), NATO members expressed their willingness to start negotiations on SNF and nuclear artillery in Europe. As far as the role of the remaining nuclear weapons is concerned, these weapons will truly be weapons of last resort. In the coming years those changes will also influence our discussion on security assurances toward non-nuclear-weapon States. My Government considers this issue to be of utmost importance; we regret the lack of results in the Ad hoc Committee on this issue.

Very soon most delegations present in this room will start their participation in the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The NPT remains one of the most outstanding negotiating achievements and successful treaties of our time:

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a corner-stone for international stability. The support and commitment of the twelve member States of the European Community to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation were both clearly brought into focus by the important declaration on nuclear non-proliferation by the European Council in Dublin on 25 and 26 June last, the first of its kind by the Twelve. Allow me to quote the following: "The twelve member States of the European Community, parties to the NPT or not, will work actively to secure a successful outcome to the discussions which will take place in the forthcoming months, and in particular the deliberations of the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT, and hope that those discussions will provide stable and assured solutions to the problems encountered by the international community in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons". End of quotation. It goes without saying that my delegation will be working to the best of its abilities for a successful outcome of the Review Conference, if possible through a substantive final declaration documenting the implementation of the Treaty provisions and the commitments in the 1985 Final Document. That will be another milestone on the road to 1995, when the Treaty will be up for extension. One of the linchpins of the NPT, but surely not the only one, is article VI. Its subject-matter should be seen in a broad perspective.

In a sense, debating non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not a prerogative of the States parties to the NPT alone. Through in-depth and detailed discussion of various subjects of the nuclear items on our agenda, the Conference on Disarmament might contribute to a proper understanding of the essentials of nuclear arms control and disarmament. In this context we witnessed a remarkable event only recently, that is, the participation of the American and Soviet negotiators to the Nuclear and Space Talks in an informal plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament, where their brief statements were followed by an ample exchange of questions and answers.

If one aspect emerged clearly from those discussions, it certainly was the fact that the future treaty on strategic offensive arms will effect significant reductions in strategic offensive arms, thereby increasing stability and lowering the risk of war. It will thus have an impact far beyond the direct bilateral scope of the treaty itself. We, therefore, sincerely hope that the timetable as set out by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev at their recent talks in Washington can be kept and that the signature of this treaty will be a fact by the end of 1990 or the beginning of 1991. In carrying through an important reduction of the "first strike" potential of both Parties involved, this Treaty will form an essential contribution to the creation of more strategic stability and the strengthening of international security. We welcome the fact that the United States and the USSR have also agreed to pursue new talks, after the signing of a START agreement, on further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of both countries.

It is not, however, only in the bilateral field on strategic offensive arms that prospects are good. Indeed, multilateral negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe are progressing steadily. The Netherlands puts the highest priority on completing this year the CFE treaty, which aims at reducing substantially the conventional armaments in Europe and eliminates as a matter of priority the capability for launching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. One of the most remarkable features

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of the treaty is the intrusiveness of the envisaged verification régime. The Netherlands also favours the completion of a meaningful CSBM package. And reductions will continue. CSBMs will be further expanded.

The near-future potential for tangible success in arms control in Europe looks good. These are all steps achieved in relation to the nuclear and conventional components of disarmament under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Of course, we are aware that certain States feel apprehensions about the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indeed, article VI is repeatedly invoked to allege lack of progress on the issue of nuclear disarmament. The Netherlands rejects such accusations, and certainly now: the record on nuclear and conventional disarmament clearly shows the contrary. Although we have not yet reached the final goal spelled out in article VI, we are certainly on our way to implementing it in good faith. This is a fair truth and it needs to be said so accordingly.

In the debate on nuclear disarmament one cannot avoid mentioning the issue of testing. Early next year a major conference will take place to look into the possibility of converting the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We understand and respect the concerns of those States which have called for this "PTBT amendment conference". There is no doubt that, according to the Treaty, States have the right to call for or to propose amendments. If the Netherlands has any doubts concerning the expediency of such a conference, it does so mainly for practical reasons. It seems to us that the positions of various States on the issue of a comprehensive test ban are still much too far apart. Consensus on the issue eludes us so far. It seems, therefore, that the outcome of the conference will almost certainly not meet the hopes and efforts of the States which originally came forward with the idea of a Treaty amendment conference. After all, it is because of the fact that certain divergences of view proved insurmountable at the time of its creation, that the Partial Test Ban Treaty was given only limited scope. There is no indication that this situation has changed, notwithstanding the progress in seismic verification methods. The call for amending the Treaty is therefore premature.

Despite the doubts which my Government harbours on the procedure and the possible outcome of the Treaty amendment conference, it will participate in a positive spirit. A debate on the issue of nuclear tests might well lead to a better understanding of the issues involved. This would serve us all.

In the CD we have just reached agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". It took the CD years to achieve consensus on the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee. It was, indeed, an almost painful process and this by itself is a clear token of the complexity of the issue as well as of the clear emotions it carries with it. Here again we find no room for radical and simple solutions.

The Netherlands position on nuclear-testing limitations is clear and has been explained on a number of occasions: nuclear tests should be reduced both in number and in yield, concurrent with the ongoing process of deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. We do subscribe to the goal of a CTBT, the realization of which should be seen in the context of a process of disarmament. Along the

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road of reducing both nuclear weapons and the reliance on those weapons in the strategy of dissuasion, halting tests could be contemplated as a further stimulus to rid the world of nuclear weapons eventually.

Does this mean that the role of the Conference on Disarmament on the issue of a nuclear test ban is condemned and reduced to be a marginal one? No! The fact that the Ad hoc Committee's mandate provides for the initiation of substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including verification and compliance, as well as structure and scope, in the framework of an ad hoc committee, is a clear indication of our common commitment. All of us do attach major political importance to paving the road, or, if you prefer, to preparing the ground for future negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

There are numerous aspects to be discussed, e.g. matters like an international seismic monitoring network, assessment of present and potential capabilities for monitoring compliance, the necessary institutional arrangements, other specific verification problems and new technologies. Solving these issues will be crucial for a future test-ban treaty. In view of their complexity it cannot be excluded that the actual agreement itself, the total cessation of nuclear tests, when time is ripe, will turn out to be the easiest part of all. In saying so, I refer to the encouragement to be taken from the agreements reached by the Soviet Union and the United States on threshold test-ban verification. We do hope and expect that they will continue along the same road and will speedily address the important issue of further limitation of the number and yield of tests. We note the call by the USSR for the next bilateral round to start in September next.

There is also the ongoing work of the Group of Scientific Experts. The GSE have indicated to the Conference on Disarmament their desire for proper political impetus and direction. We believe this is indeed opportune, since the occasion to do so presents itself now. The Netherlands has actively contributed to the work of the GSE. It is clear in our view that seismic methods are the corner-stone for effective verification of a future treaty. The experience with GSETT-2 will, in our opinion, be quite telling in this regard. Even with the limited detection capability in the Netherlands we were already able to identify 65 per cent of all underground nuclear explosions in 1989. International exchange of data will lead to substantial detection and identification capabilities.

In the CD there are a number of practical and specific steps in this regard that we could take: the President of the Conference could convey to the Chairman of the GSE a message of unconditional support for the work of the GSE and for the ongoing GSETT-2 experiment in particular; the CD could ask the GSE to make an assessment of present and potential seismic detection and identification capabilities. In the first GSE report such an assessment was made, but that is more than 10 years ago; nuclear-weapon States could be called upon to provide information about the precise time, location and yield of their nuclear tests. This information should be given soon after the nuclear test and be passed on to our respective national seismology divisions. It would help them considerably in their research.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

My third subject today is chemical weapons. Regrettably, we have to admit that negotiations on chemical weapons do not progress with the speed which we all desire. Perhaps this is inevitable, perhaps not. I would like to see it more philosophically, as a fact of our negotiating life in the CD. The achievement on a total ban of chemical weapons should indeed be the highest priority of this Conference. The Netherlands would therefore like to offer some suggestions for speeding up the negotiations.

In our view, the negotiations at this moment hinge on two major and interrelated issues, i.e. challenge inspections and routine inspections. Challenge and routine inspections are the two pillars which support one and the same basic structure which we all strive for: compliance with a chemical weapons ban. Challenge and routine inspections, including ad hoc verification, not only complement each other, but are also strongly interrelated. The more encompassing one system is, the less often we need the other.

We believe that the present "rolling text" pivots upon the concept of challenge inspections: the solution to this issue, which will mainly consist of the development of adequate procedures for managed access, might well put many other remaining problems into another, more benevolent light. My delegation is therefore very pleased with the conclusion of the British Minister of State, William Waldegrave, that in the view of the United Kingdom there is no site so sensitive from the national security viewpoint that some form of access within the site, appropriately managed, could not be allowed to an international inspection team. On a preliminary basis we came to the same conclusion. The fact that the United Kingdom could draw such a conclusion after six elaborate trial inspections in different types of sensitive installations - not one country has matched their efforts in this field - should be taken into account very seriously by all of us.

We believe that the problems of challenge inspections can only be solved through the medium of properly agreed procedures for managed access. If we concentrate on those, we might be able to solve the problems of the original and unique concept of challenge inspections: anytime, anywhere, without the right of refusal.

Why is that so important? Besides the fact that there exists an emerging consensus that challenge inspections are not just a unique method of last resort to determine compliance, the concept of challenge inspections has acquired not only a political, but also a philosophical connotation: it is opening up the world for arms control and disarmament; it is a real step towards our stated common goal: "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". If we weaken the original character of challenge inspections, doubts would be raised about the effectiveness of the chemical weapons ban as a security treaty. Consequently, political support for the treaty would be lost. There are those who advocate a filter mechanism to determine whether a challenge request constitutes a "détournement de pouvoir". The Netherlands believes that the introduction of such filter mechanisms would seriously harm the effectiveness of challenge inspections.

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Legend has it that a hole in a dyke can be plugged with a finger. This is not so. From hard experience we have learned that, unless you build solid dykes, you will drown in the flood. For those who have serious national security problems, solutions can be found through properly negotiated and agreed procedures for managed access, as was proven by the United Kingdom. The example of the IAEA and the role accredited to its Board of Governors shows that rules and regulations can be found to secure an impartial and proper procedure for international investigations in national installations. We should proceed accordingly. It is not by talking neatly that we can convince other States. It is through their own experience and practice that States can eventually solve problem areas. We therefore urge States which have not yet done so to engage in such trial challenge inspections.

We ourselves have done the same. I take pleasure in presenting today our own report on the first trial challenge inspection at an operational air base in the Netherlands. The document will be distributed as CD/1018, concurrently CD/CW/WP.307. A more detailed introduction has already been given in the Ad hoc Committee yesterday.

The other pillar of our verification system is constituted by routine inspections. The "rolling text" provides for an elaborate system of such inspections that covers facilities which have been declared to produce scheduled chemicals. It does not, however, cover all those plants which are quite capable of producing chemical weapons and their precursors but which have not been declared.

Of course, such facilities would be subject to challenge inspections. My delegation, however, looks upon such inspections as a procedure of last resort: it is esential for the convention, but not for routine use. Easy access to the chemical industry, in a non-intrusive and routine manner, would be a confidence-building measure of major importance. The recent proposal by Australia on ad hoc verification would fully meet our concerns: it would establish the missing link in the envisaged verification system. It is therefore an element of great concern to the Netherlands Government to find that efforts are made to block further consideration of this issue, even before the different elements of the proposal have been properly discussed and elaborated. We, for our part, are determined to pursue this issue, which is an essential element of the verification system as a whole.

If my memory serves me right, it was the German Democratic Republic which had, on occasion, suggested that a ministerial meeting might be opportune to push our work further. At the time, the idea as such did not particularly appeal to us, as we would have preferred to solve the problems before any ministerial conference. In view of the structure of the CW negotiations and its prolonged history and of the fact that we do need results in the light of growing dangers of proliferation, we have come to the conclusion that a ministerial meeting might after all be worthwhile.

The CD could envisage such a meeting at the beginning of our negotiating period next year. On that occasion Ministers could not only set a deadline for the termination of the negotiations later that year, but also give directions on the lines along which problems should be solved. Second, Ministers might want to meet again later that year, just before the expiry of

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the deadline. The remaining problems would all have to be solved then and there. Ministers could then also consider the follow-up, including the manner in which universality of adherence to the convention could be achieved. In this context, it is proper to recall the intention of the North Atlantic allies, as stated in the final communiqué of the Turnberry ministerial meeting (document CD/1006), to be among the original signatories to the CW convention and to promote its early entry into force.

In the meantime, we here at the negotiating table have to do all we can to achieve consensus treaty language. We must make full use of any intersessional period that becomes available. And in the daily pursuit of our common responsibilities in establishing the desired chemical weapons ban, we should not shy away, where necessary, from vigorous action.

Finally, Mr. President, you will have noted the keen interest of the Netherlands in the issue of the seat of the chemical weapons treaty Organization. In a few weeks time I hope to be able to shed more light on the particular details of our proposition.

Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia): As Ambassador Wisber Loeis has been unexpectedly called away to another important engagement, he has authorized me to read the statement of the Indonesian delegation on his behalf.

Allow me to associate myself with previous speakers in expressing the immense pleasure of the Indonesian delegation at seeing you, Sir, the representative of Poland, presiding over our deliberations for the month of July. Your skill and expertise have been much in evidence this month in guiding the work of the Conference to a successful conclusion. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation at the manner in which Ambassador de Rivero of Peru guided our work during the month of June. The Indonesian delegation would like to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Ricupero of Brazil, Ambassador Indrajit Singh Chadha of India, Ambassador von Wagner of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Králik of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ambassador Vaerno of Norway and Ambassador Pérez-Villanueva of Spain, who have joined us in this current session of the Conference on Disarmament. The Indonesian delegation looks forward to working with their respective delegations towards the attainment of our common goals.

I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express the Indonesian delegation's regret at the departure of Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Truan Hoan of Viet Nam and Ambassador Varga of Hungary. Their wisdom and constructive contributions to the cause of disarmament will be missed by all of us. We wish them every success in their new undertakings.

It has been repeatedly said in this hall that the present session of the Conference is taking place in a unique and unprecedented international environment which has far-reaching repercussions on the subject under consideration, as well as on the most appropriate procedure to deal with them in the Conference. Indeed, events outside this room are offering much that is new and positive. The dynamics and magnitude of the changes have created a mixed sense of anxiety, earnest hope and sometimes impatience in this room during these last few months.

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All of these developments have been a source of expectation for further rapid progress in the work of this Conference. Yet, during these last two months of meetings we have become even more aware of the need to examine carefully those matters to be dealt with by the Conference at this crucial juncture. I fully accept that we need to pause for a few moments to seek ways and means to further progress. The ongoing informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan are a timely necessity and merit our full support.

As regards the matters under discussion at these informal open-ended consultations, in my earlier statement I had the opportunity to express my views concerning the agenda for the Conference. I wish also to state that as for the procedural changes in the conduct of the CD sessions, particularly the "CD sessions schedule" and "the plenary meeting schedule", my delegation has an open mind.

As for the schedule of the CD sessions, I wish to reiterate that the objective in changing the present timetable of the Conference is to increase the effectiveness of its work. Observations made on the present system have noted that two weeks are always set aside at the beginning of each session of the Conference for a form of "preparatory work". During this two week period the Conference moves so slowly and no substantial discussion is carried out. Unless we are ready to start the discussions at an earlier date in any given Conference session, the rescheduling would only introduce three periods of "preparatory work" instead of two in the present system.

In this connection, my delegation is pleased to note the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. In this respect, I wish to pay tribute to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, and to his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, as well as to the President of the Conference for the month of July, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, for their tireless endeavours to finally establish the Committee.

It is to be noted that the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban only started working in the second week of July and will continue during the first two weeks of August. There will be only four weeks left for the Committee to discuss matters relevant to its work prior to the period when the Conference starts discussing its report to the United Nations General Assembly. The four weeks envisaged will be quite insufficient for even an elaboration of a programme of work, let alone for a discussion on substantive issues. I suggest, therefore, that the very precious time still available be fully utilized to discuss and decide matters relevant to the future work of the Committee. We should take a decision by the end of this summer session on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at the beginning of the next spring session, in order that the work towards the total elimination of nuclear testing is undertaken as expeditiously as possible.

In discussing the question of a nuclear test ban, I wish to refer to the contents of the preambular paragraphs of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. It should be recalled that the original parties proclaimed as one of their principal aims the speediest possible achievement of an agreement which would eliminate the incentive to produce and test all kinds of weapons, including

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nuclear weapons. It is solemnly accepted therefore that the ultimate objective of the PTBT is a total ban on all nuclear tests. Within the Conference, as well as in New York, attempts have been made for some years now to lead us to that goal. With the decision to convene the PTBT amendment conference, avenues are open to us today both in this Conference and in New York. Yet, the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee in the Conference and the forthcoming PTBT amendment conference should not infringe on one another. The work of the Ad hoc Committee and that of the PTBT amendment conference to be held in January 1991 should, on the contrary, be in tandem with, and mutually complement each other.

Indonesia has long since adhered to the Treaty and has never sought nuclear weapons options for its defence purposes. In the light of the latest developments in this Conference, as well as of the preparations for the amendment conference of the PTBT, my delegation entertains optimism that universal acceptance of the stand taken by the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, including my own, will hopefully gain ground in the near future. The era in which the major protagonists have overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion and mutual distrust does not need any nuclear weapons.

During these past few years there has been widely shared expectation that the chemical weapons convention is within reach. The insertion of the provisions concerning the annex on chemicals and the protocol on inspection procedures in the "rolling text" of last year, as well as the achievements accomplished during the spring session on matters relating to verification, have further increased the grounds for optimism. At this summer session, my delegation has also noted with satisfaction the efforts of the Ad hoc Committee's Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius, in trying to set provisions concerning on-site inspection on request by a State or States parties to another State party. The idea to amend the well-known wording of "challenge inspection" to "inspection on request" is constructive. As I mentioned in my previous statement, this type of verification should not be conducted on the basis of a strong motivation of suspicion. The idea to abandon the use of the word "challenge" would lessen the notion of suspicion in the implementation of this set of provisions.

Admittedly, much progress has already been achieved on the elaboration of the detailed provisions of numerous parts of the convention. Moreover, the setting of the provisions, which are relevant to the latest developments in the relations among States, has also been attempted with regard to inspection on request.

A slight apprehension has, however, emerged recently concerning the pace of progress in the negotiations. For a country like my own which has never produced or possessed chemical weapons - nor will it ever - the idea of linking the destruction of all chemical weapons to the adherence of certain categories of States has caused uncertainty concerning the desired universal adherence to the Convention. Such a linkage could, I believe, lead to the continuing existence of such weapons by, inter alia, inducing States which have not possessed chemical weapons to acquire them prior to the entry into force of the convention. Such an approach also implies legitimizing acts of coercion of a weaker State or States by a stronger State, thence endangering the goal of universal adherence. There is a shared conviction that one of the

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most feasible ways to attract the adherence of States which as a result of particular circumstances possess - or will possess - chemical weapons lies in the need to set up an appropriate approach to discourage such States from choosing the chemical weapons option.

There is also widespread belief that, as we wish to conclude a convention with universal adherence, then we should, indeed, consider the interests of the majority of States which do not possess, or intend to possess, chemical weapons. This implies that the convention should provide a guarantee for the unimpeded right of every State party to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and chemical technology for peaceful purposes. The convention should not hinder international co-operation, nor trade in chemicals for peaceful purposes.

As a non-chemical-weapon State, my country has always stood - and will continue to do so - for the total prohibition and destruction of all existing chemical weapons. Although we do not possess such weapons, there is a foreseeable possibility that we might have to destroy chemical weapons which were abandoned in our territory. As this matter is going to be taken up in further consultations, my delegation would only wish to reiterate its deeply held principle that the discovering State should not be burdened with the responsibility of destroying the abandoned chemicals.

My delegation was made even more aware of the magnitude of the difficulty of protecting civilians, as well as other targets from a chemical weapon attack, when visiting the Münster chemical weapons destruction and training facilities thanks to the generous invitation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. We indeed realize that such protective actions which are to be carried out in a dense tropical area such as my own country would be a tremendously delicate and costly task. Despite the need for assistance deriving from the foreseeable difficulties, it is also my belief that a commitment for compulsory assistance from the "haves" to the "have nots", constitutes a means of deterring from the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. My country therefore attaches great importance to the inclusion in the future convention of a provision for assistance which could fully satisfy the imperative need for such assistance in case of attack or threat of attack of chemical weapons.

A convention which is effective and verifiable and which attracts universal adherence requires a verification system which creates confidence among States parties with regard to compliance with the convention. Such a verification system needs first of all a set of solid routine verification régimes, and I believe that the establishment of an inspection system which permits the conduct of an inspection measure to ensure compliance by any State party at any time and at any place is also necessary. Since the establishment of these sets of verification systems is the subject of intensive negotiations, my delegation would prefer that all members of the Conference be invited to finalize the establishment of those two sets of verification systems before we embark upon examination of other verification systems.

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The positive consequences of disarmament for development efforts have been widely recognized for a long time. It is a truism that the continuity of the arms race among nations absorbs far too great a proportion of the world's human, financial, natural and technological resources. Studies carried out by United Nations experts, as well as by other groups or individuals, have shown that the arms race places a heavy burden on the economies of all countries and affects the international flow of trade, finance and technology, and thereby hinders the process of confidence-building among States developed and developing alike.

Despite the magnitude of military expenditure, which still contrasts dramatically with economic and social under-development, misery and poverty, there are new and positive developments toward the reduction of armaments. This, of course, would allow a greater redeployment of resources used for the arms race to development. There is currently a common willingness to seek security at lower levels of armaments and to find ways to reduce national and regional military expenditure.

The readiness for far-reaching arms control and even for a set of disarmament measures on the part of those developed nations which are heavy armed makes it possible for the States concerned not only to achieve significant budgetary savings but also to put economic development as a priority. In a more relaxed security environment those States could formulate an integrated national, as well as regional, economic strategy without worrying whether it jeopardized military considerations. There is a profound necessity among statesmen and those engaged in the field of disarmament, however, to awaken the spirit of internationalism. This spirit would be particularly prone to opposing any overestimation of national defence expenditure on the grounds that the decrease in international tension should lead to a reallocation of defence expenditure for international development.

My delegation was greatly interested by the proposal of President Richard von Weizsäcker and former Chancellor Willy Brandt envisaging the reallocation for economic growth in developing countries of one third of the resources saved from military cuts as a consequence of a unified Germany. Likewise, my delegation was also attracted by the proposal of the President of the World Bank in his speech recently suggesting that developed nations should ideally reduce their military expenditure by 10-15 per cent, thereby enabling themselves to redouble their assistance to the developing nations in carrying out their development programmes. Such moves should enjoy world-wide support.

This present decade will be a decade of change, challenges and hope. I believe, therefore, that the unprecedented opportunities that are opening up at the end of this century should not be squandered.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I have no other speakers inscribed for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? This is not the case.

(The President)

The secretariat has circulated today the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committees. It is merely indicative and subject to change, if the need arises. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable as proposed.

I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): I understand that this schedule is subject to change and, as we all know, the Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 1 is to meet on Friday afternoon, which is not convenient to many delegations as it is the end of the week. If we can find any other slot, I would like to discuss that with the chairmen of other Committees and, if possible, I would like to request that the time be changed. Of course, that does not mean that the number of meetings for the Ad hoc Committee itself will be reduced, but please allow me to explore the possibility.

The PRESIDENT: It seems to me that we should do everything possible to meet your requirements.

I recognize the distinguished representative of the United States.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): On behalf of my country, I would like to underline the point that was just made by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 1. Speaking for ourselves, due to the international time difference between Geneva and the east coast of North America, we have a very special problem with the encumbrance of Friday afternoon with work on this important Committee and, judging by the statements we have heard today, Tuesday and previously, a high priority seems to be given by the Conference to the work of this newly established Ad hoc Committee. Our problem is that, without Friday afternoon, there is no way we can have adequate instructions by the following Monday on fast developments unless we report early. Accordingly, I have to say that United States concurrence with the proposed schedule is provisional upon the understanding that serious efforts will be made to avoid repetition of the encumbrance of Friday afternoon in the future.

The PRESIDENT: I am assured by the distinguished Personal Representative of the Secretary-General that the secretariat will take this into account on the understanding that this should be done in co-operation with the chairmen of other subsidiary bodies. This is in addition to the promise made by the secretariat. On this understanding, may I consider that this provisional informal timetable for next week meets with agreement around the negotiating table?

It was so decided.

I have no other business for today and I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 31 July, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.